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Louisiana's Right to Counsel in Light of Moran v. Burbine
The United States Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine held that
an accused does not have to be told of the presence of his attorney
because it does not affect the voluntary and knowing waiver of his
Miranda rights. 2 In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court has found'
that deception 4 as to the availability of an attorney renders a defendant's
statements inadmissible. This note will consider whether Louisiana courts
will choose to follow the rationale in Moran or whether they will strictly
adhere to prior decisions on the basis of the Louisiana Constitution and
statutes in order to remain unaffected by the Moran decision.
First, Moran v. Burbine will be analyzed, emphasizing the right to
counsel aspect of the fifth' and sixth6 amendments of the United States
Constitution. Then, Louisiana's present provisions concerning the right
to counsel under both the United States and Louisiana constitutions will
be addressed. Finally, the possible responses of Louisiana courts to the
Moran opinion will be investigated, giving emphasis to the Louisiana
Constitution and certain statutory provisions.
Moran v. Burbine
Brian Burbine was arrested by the Cranston, Rhode Island police
in connection with a breaking and entering charge. A Cranston detective
had learned two days earlier that a man named "Butch" (which was
later discovered to be Burbine's nickname) was being sought for a murder
in Providence, Rhode Island. Burbine's sister, without the defendant's
knowledge, contacted the office of the public defender to ask for as-
sistance by previously assigned counsel. 7 When this attorney could not
be contacted, Ms. Munson, an assistant public defender, was informed
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
2. Id. at 1137.
3. State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982), and State v. Trevathan, 414 So.
2d 316 (La. 1982), are two examples of the Louisiana court's present position. Other
opinions will be expounded on in this note.
4. The writer recognizes that deception is a broad term; however, for purposes of
this note, deception will be limited to the relation touching on the attorney and client
with regard to the client's fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel.
5. U.S. Const. amend. V.
6. U.S. Const. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
7. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135-39 (1986).
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of the telephone call by the defendant's sister. Ms. Munson then called
the Cranston police station and explained to someone in the detective
division that Brian Burbine was being represented by an attorney and
that, in the event that he was to be questioned or placed in a line-up,
she would act as his legal counsel. An unidentified person told her that
Burbine would not be questioned or put through a line-up and that
they were through with him for the night.' That same night a signed
confession was obtained from Burbine after he waived his Miranda
rights. 9
United States Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel Claim
The majority found that Burbine had validly waived his right to
remain silent and his right to have counsel present, finding that the
voluntariness of the waiver was not at issue.'0 The dissent forcefully
disagreed, citing numerous state court opinions in support of its finding
that "attorney communication to the police about the client is an event
that has direct bearing on the knowing and intelligent waiver of con-
stitutional rights."'" The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 2 had
noted that intentional "or reckless misleading" of counsel who displays
a legitimate and professional interest in his client and expresses to the
police a willingness to be present at custodial interrogation of the ac-
cused, in addition to the lack of communication by the police of the
attorney's desire to confer with the suspect, "is more than just one
factor in the calculus of waiver. The combination of these situations
clearly vitiates any claim that a waiver of counsel was knowing and
voluntary."' 3 The court of appeals had found that the police depart-
ment's failure to inform the defendant of the telephone call from Munson
constituted intentional "or reckless irresponsibility.' ' 4 The Burbine ma-
jority recognized that police trickery could have voided the defendant's
waiver; however, the Court found that the failure to inform Burbine
of the telephone call was not the type of "trickery" that will vitiate a
waiver's validity. 5 On the other hand, Justice Stevens stated in dissent
that there can be no constitutional distinction between a deceptive mis-
statement and a concealment by the police of the critical fact that
counsel secured by the defendant or his family has offered assistance,
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1141.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1159.
12. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 187.
14. Id. at 185.
15. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
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either by telephone or in person. 16 Miranda clearly condemns trickery
or threats that would cause a defendant to make an unwise waiver of
his rights, even when he fully understands those rights.17
The critical determination is whether the suspect's waiver of his
rights can be induced or elicited by forces outside of the interrogation
room. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stated that events happening
outside of the suspect's presence "and entirely unknown" to him have
no effect on his ability to understand and knowingly relinquish a con-
stitutional right.'" Justice O'Connor did acknowledge that the additional
information of the fact of the attorney's presence would have been
useful to Burbine and even might have affected his decision to confess. 9
This would seem to contradict the majority's argument that Burbine's
waiver was valid; however, Justice O'Connor justified the holding by
saying that the Court has never read the "Constitution to require that
the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him
calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his
rights."' 20 In Miranda v. Arizona2' the Court thought differently and
required that an assessment of police conduct figure importantly in
determining the validity of a suspect's decision to waive his fundamental
constitutional rights. Miranda noted a close relationship -between the
right against self-incrimination and the methods of police interrogation. 22
The Court stated: "As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in
the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in
courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. ' 23
In addition, Miranda set out specific requirements for the police to
follow, requiring a flow of information to the defendant to assist his
decision whether to remain silent or to speak. Justice O'Connor's lan-
guage in Moran appears to limit that flow of information, placing the
accused's right to counsel in jeopardy and also confusing the police
department's analysis of the quantity of information required to be given
to an accused.
United States Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Claim
The Moran majority dispelled the sixth amendment claim by finding
that the confession and interrogation sessions took place before the
16. Id. at 1158.
17. Id. at 1142.
18. Id. at 1141.
19. Id. at 1142.
20. Id.
21. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
22. Id. at 458, 86 S. Ct. at 1619.
23. Id. at 461, 86 S. Ct. at 1621.
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initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings," and therefore that the
right to counsel had not attached.2 4 In United States v. Gouveia25 the
Court promoted this view by stating that the sixth amendment requires
the existence of both a "criminal prosecution" and an "accused," and
that the plain language of the amendment, coupled with its purpose of
protecting the unaided layman during critical confrontations with his
adversary, leads to the conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at
.the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. 26 The Moran
court also dismissed the claim that the sixth amendment right can be
triggered at earlier "critical" pretrial events that may have important
consequences at trial.
27
Even if the sixth amendment right to counsel did not extend to this
situation, the defense argued that an attorney-client relationship had
already been established between Burbine and his retained attorney, and
that this pre-existing relationship gave Burbine the implicit right to
communicate with an attorney seeking to assist bim.2 " The defense
stressed that this pre-existing relationship may have affected Burbine's
decision to waive counsel: "[lInforming the defendant of the attorney's
call would have told him that his family was with him, and that the
police were telling him one thing and the attorney another. This might
have made a difference in his decision to waive counsel."
29
The Moran dissent hinted at this attorney-client relationship, though
in a different context. Justice Stevens stated that since Munson was
already acting as Burbine's attorney, under principles of agency law the
deliberate deception of the attorney was tantamount to deliberate de-
24. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
25. 467 U.S. 180, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984).
26. Id. at 188, 104 S. Ct. at 2298.
27. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147. To adopt a strict rule that the sixth amendment can
not be triggered at critical pretrial events seems to jeopardize the intended function to
assure that in any 'criminal prosecution' the accused will not be left to his own devices
in facing the 'prosecutorial forces of organized society."' Id. at 1146. Over the years
the Court has shown confusion over whether the sixth amendment can attach before the
onset of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Justice Stewart's language in Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239-40 (1977), evidenced the Court's
confusion: "proceedings had been initiated ... [a] warrant had been issued for his arrest,
he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge and he had been committed by
the court to confinement in jail." This statement sparked confusion over whether the
Court was extending the attachment of the sixth amendment as far back as the issuance
of the arrest warrant. Even though the Court has hinted in other cases that critical stages
exist for the need of counsel, recent decisions such as Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.
Ct. 2292, and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985), lead to the
conclusion that the Supreme Court intends to follow the rule that the sixth amendment
attaches only after the onset of formal adversial proceedings.




ception of her client.30 This is not the first time that principles of agency
law have been applied. In Brewer v. Williams3' the defendant had
"asserted his right to counsel by having secured attorneys at both ends
of the automobile trip, both of whom, acting as his agents, had made
clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey."
2
Stevens stressed that the "character of the attorney-client relationship
requires rejection of the Court's notion that counsel is some entirely
distinct, completely severable entity and that deception of the attorney
is irrelevant to the right of counsel in custodial interrogation." 33 This
relationship between the attorney and his client is also a basis for cases
holding that the client must accept the consequences of a mistake made
by his attorney in the course of representing that client.1
4
Despite persuasive evidence that Burbine's right to counsel was vi-
olated, Justice O'Connor would contend nevertheless that this right to
request counsel is personal to the client and can only be exercised by
him.33 This analysis may be justified in the present fact situation since
Burbine was already represented by counsel and had been through this
procedure before.3 6 More troublesome are the consequences of the Moran
rationale if extended to a first offender, or one who is not familiar
with the adversial process.
Present State of the Law in Regard to the Accused's Right to
Counsel
Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation
Miranda v. Arizona created strict requirements to assure that an
accused's fifth amendment right to counsel was voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently relinquished during police interrogations. The Supreme
Court's aim in Miranda was to assure that the accused's constitutional
right to "choose between silence and speech remains unfettered through-
out the interrogation process."
'3 7
Miranda set out the requirements for a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, that being the knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a
constitutional right.38 The voluntariness of the waiver is determined by
30. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163.
31. 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
32. Id. at 405, 97 S. Ct. at 1242 (emphasis added).
33. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163.
34. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 (1982).
35. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1140.
36. Id.
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469; 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966).
38. Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.
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inquiring into any fraud, deception, duress or other inducements used
to obtain it. The knowing aspect focuses on whether the accused has
been adequately informed of his constitutional rights. In this regard,
Miranda imposed several guidelines for police to follow in custodial
interrogations.39 The court held that the individual "must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation .... ,,40 Miranda also recognized
that modern interrogation is psychologically oriented and that "the blood
of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquis-
ition.''
4 1
Louisiana law similarly contemplates the psychologically coercive
nature of the in-custody interrogation process, and thus provides inter-
rogated persons with protections under the Louisiana Constitution 42 and
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 and 15:452. Section 15:452 states:
"No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed
by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of crime." '43 Section
15:451, of which section 15:452 is a corollary, provides: "Before what
purposes to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be
affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under
the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements
or promises." 4 These two statutes are designed to protect the consti-
tutional rights of the defendant.
45
39. Miranda employs procedural safeguards which police officers and interrogators
must follow as guidelines. These measures provide that prior to questioning an accussed,
"the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
40. Id. at 471, 86 S. Ct. at 1626.
41. Id. at 448, 86 S. Ct. at 1614.
42. La. Const. Art. I § 13:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the inves-
tigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason
for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self-
incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right
to court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution, an accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. At each stage
of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice,
or appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable
by imprisonment. The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing
and compensating qualified counsel for indigents.
43. La. R.S. 14:452 (1981) (emphasis added).
44. La. R.S. 14:451 (1981).
45. State v. Coleman, 390 So. 2d 865, 868 (La. 1980). "By imposing an affirmative
burden on the state to show that a defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily
given," these articles safeguard "a defendant's Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination."
NOTES
The timing of these statutes and of Miranda is an important con-
sideration in the analysis of Louisiana's present policy towards the
suspect's right of access to counsel. Sections 15:451 and 15:452 were
enacted by the Louisiana legislature before the 1966 decision of Mi-
randa.4 6 Thus, the Louisiana legislature contemplated the effect of de-
ception on the validity of an accused's confession prior to the United
States Supreme Court's mandatory requirements of Miranda, and pro-
vided the Miranda safeguards before the decision through sections 15:451
and 15:452. It has also been noted 41 that the 1974 constitutional revision
incorporated the Miranda safeguards in section 13 of article I of the
Louisiana Constitution. However, State v. Jackson,48 decided under the
1921 constitution, shows that the philosophy of Miranda was already
incorporated into our judicial system.
Jackson, which is factually similar to Moran, held that although an
accused does not know that her family has retained an attorney for
her, governmental officials are not justified in ignoring her constitutional
right to such counsel. In 1982 the Louisiana Supreme Court continued
to adhere to the protections of Louisiana law in State v. Matthews.4 9
In Matthews, the defendant contacted his attorney prior to his arrest
and was advised not to say anything to the authorities.50 He was later
arrested and charged with murder. Shortly after the arrest, his attorney
called the station house and was informed that Matthews was being
interviewed and that the attorney would not be allowed to speak with
him. At this point the attorney requested that no one interview Mat-
thews." The attorney later went to the police station and was subse-
quently told that Matthews had given a statement.5 2 The court emphasized
that the policy of our state, both constitutional and statutory, favors
an individual "having the assistance of counsel during in-custody in-
terrogation and prohibits any interference with it by governmental au-
thorities." 53 The court in Matthews required that the defendant be
informed of his attorney's presence. Without this information, the sub-
sequent questioning was made without the informed waiver of the ac-
cused's right to counsel and option to remain silent.14 Further, by
adoption of article I, section 13, Louisiana incorporated and enhanced
46. 1928 La. Acts No. 2, § 1, art. 452.
47. Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the La. Const. of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1,
40 (1974).
48. 303 So. 2d 734 (La. 1974).
49. 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982).
50. Id. at 1275.
51. Id. at 1275-76.
52. Id. at 1276.
53. Id. at 1277.
54. Id. at 1278.
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the Miranda safeguards." It is clear that the court's holding was based
on the fact that without the knowledge of his attorney's call and later
presence at the police station, the defendant could not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel. "A suspect indifferent to an
abstract offer to call a nameless lawyer may regard differently his
opportunity to talk to an identified attorney actually available and willing
to assist him during interrogation.
6
As well as the constitutional mandate of assistance of counsel,
Matthews points out Louisiana's statutory policy favoring the assistance
of counsel during custodial interrogation. Article 230 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure states: "The person arrested has, from the moment
of his arrest, a right to procure and confer with counsel and to use a
telephone or send a messenger for the purpose of communication with
his friends or with counsel." '5 7 Based on this statute and on article I,
section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution, Matthews indicates that Lou-
isiana welcomes and encourages counsel to consult with his client in
order for the client to make an intelligent exercise of his rights while
in custodial interrogation.
In State v. Serrato,5 the court faced a similar issue. In Serrato,
the defendant was arrested for the murder of his wife.5 9 At some point
during the interrogation, Serrato asked to be provided with or recom-
mended to an attorney. After fruitless efforts to contact an attorney,
a detective was instructed to contact the Indigent Defender Board. Serrato
continued to be questioned on a rotating basis and was not informed
that an attorney had been contacted. The director of the Indigent De-
fender Board had been called and told that the defendant wished to
confer with counsel before talking to the police.60 An, attorney was
located by the Board and sent to the station, but was detained for over
one-half of an hour before being directed to the detective's annex. At
the annex, he was again detained and was not allowed to see the
defendant. 61 The court held that the police officers failed to honor
scrupulously the defendant's right to counsel, and that once counsel had
been obtained the defendant had the right to be informed that an attorney
was available and willing to assist him.
62
55. Id. at 1277.
56. Id. at 1278.
57. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 230 (emphasis added). See also Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932).
58. 424 So. 2d 214 (La. 1982).
59. Id. at 216.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id. At the annex the attorney was detained and asked by three officers if he
had been drinking. The officers refused to allow the attorney to confer with his client,
alleging that he was too intoxicated.
62. Id. at 220.
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The Serrato court continued by finding no constitutional or statutory
provision in Louisiana that would allow the police arbitrarily to prevent
or block communication between a prisoner and an attorney who has
been asked to represent the accused. 63 The court went on to note that*
Only the defendant has the right to reject or waive the assistance
of counsel. The police must allow counsel a private consultation
with the accused, provided that the time is reasonable. When
a person in custody is interrogated by police officers, the time
is always rezsonable for counsel to have free access to meet in
private with his client.64
The terminology expressed in articles 230 and 511 was in place
before the constitutional revision of 1974. Both the language of these
articles and that of the Miranda decision seemed to influence the drafting
of article I, section 13 during the 1974 revision. As Professor Hargrave,
coordinator of legal research for the Louisiana Constitutional Conven-
tion, reasons, the incorporation of Miranda into section 13 clearly con-
templates the right to the appointment of counsel during police
questioning, and, even absent questioning, the right to an attorney who
is able to utilize the available legal mechanism to ensure that the accused
may realize the rights guaranteed by law-among them the right to a
preliminary hearing and the right to bail. 65 Hence, it follows that counsel
should be made available immediately after arrest for the timely assertion
of those rights. Hargrave noted that this "conclusion seems especially
warranted since such has traditionally been the case with respect to.
communicating with retained counsel," and further that "the committee
comments referred to 'the early assistance of counsel." '66
Jackson, Matthews, and Serrato all support the earliest possible
representation by counsel in order to insure that the accused makes a
knowing and voluntary waiver. Similarly, the American Bar Association
National Advisory Commission urges that representation begin when
"the individual either is arrested or is requested to participate in an
investigation that has focused upon him as a likely suspect. ' 67 In ad-
dition, counsel's early presence in the case can sometimes serve to
convince the prosecutor to dismiss unfounded charges, to charge the
accused with less serious offenses, or to divert the entire case from the
criminal courts.
63. Id. at 221.
64. Id., citing La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 511.
65. Hargrave, supra note 47, at 40.
66. Id. at 47.
67. Standards for Criminal Justice § 5.1 (1986).
1987]
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Deception of the Accused or Attorney Which Leads to Waiver of
Counsel
It is evident from Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 and 15:452 that
the police can not elicit a confession from the accused by the use of
deception or trickery. The Louisiana courts also have implied that a
confession will be inadmissible when the deception is directed toward
the accused's attorney when it would have a bearing on the validity of
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights.
The subject of deceptive practices by the police to obtain a confession
was addressed in State v. Reed.68 Here the defendant was taken into
custody on a Saturday and told that he would be charged with arson.
He was further informed that he would not be in jail for longer than
seventy-two hours, and that he would be in court on Monday morning.
His father obtained an attorney for him who went to court on Monday,
but the defendant was not produced in court until Wednesday, after
his attorney was told erroneously that he would be in court on four
other occasions. 69 The court drew the reasonable inference that the
suspect was kept at the jail for further, more successful interrogations.
These interrogations ended with three oral confessions and two recorded
statements. 70 The court held that when the government interferes with
the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel by giving erroneous
information to the suspect's attorney, the prosecution cannot take ad-
vantage of any incriminating statements made during time gained by
that ploy.
7'
In State v. Trevathan,72 the court continued its antipathy toward
deception of a defendant's attorney to elicit a statement from his client.
In Trevathan the attorney arrived at the sheriff's office forty-five minutes
after the client's arrest and indicated that he had been retained to
represent the defendant. Thereafter, the attorney left and told officers
that the defendant was not to be interrogated further out of the attorney's
presence or to be taken to the supposed location of the body. 7" The
defendant was later taken to the location of the body, where he asked
to speak to a detective with whom he had developed a good rapport
in a previous case. This detective knew that the defendant's counsel had
requested that the defendant not be interrogated. 74 The court found that
the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel had been violated. 75
68. 390 So. 2d 1314 (La. 1980).
69. Id. at 1315.
70. Id. at 1316.
71. Id.
72. 414 So. 2d 316 (La. 1982).
73. Id. at 318.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 319.
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This view found support in State v. West, 76 where the detectives
knew that the defendant had been advised by his attorney not to make
any statements to the police. The police, however, later obtained a
statement from him.77 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that police
initiation of interrogation contrary to defense counsel's advice violates
the defendant's right to counsel. "A defendant has not knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel when, contrary to counsel's
advice, he makes statements in response to further police inquiry."7
The court in both Trevathan and West implied that the defendant and
his attorney are each entitled to deal with the police as a single entity.
79
It may also be true that the attorney and client form another single
entity, and that deception of the attorney may be equated with deception
of the accused.
Louisiana's Response to Moran v. Burbine
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Matthews based its holding on the
right to counsel as guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution and ordered
the defendant's statement suppressed. 0 This same outcome was advanced
in Trevathan, where the decision was based on the United States Con-
stitution. Will the Moran decision change either, both, or have no effect
on these decisions? The Matthews decision indicates that the rights
guaranteed under article I, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution are
completely separate from and extend further than those found in the
United States Constitution. However, it is not yet possible to accurately
characterize the Louisiana Supreme Court's present stance. The clear
implications of the Moran rule reverse prior, contrary state court holdings
based on fifth and sixth amendment rights. The only response contrary
to Moran, still available to state courts, will be based on state consti-
tutions and statutes.
Louisiana Constitutional Violations
The decisions in Matthews and Serrato were based on the rights of
the accused guaranteed under article I, section 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution. Under a literal reading, it is apparent that this article
encompasses much more than the federal constitutional grant on which
it was based. One clear expansion is the onset of these rights, which
begin at the point of arrest or detainment. It is evident by the redactors'
76. 408 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1982).
77. Id. at 1117.
78. Id. at 1121.
79. Trevathan, 414 So. 2d at 319; West, 408 So. 2d at 1121.
80. State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982).
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use of "detain" that these rights attach much earlier than rights under
the United States Constitution. "Advising one of such rights would be
a hollow formality if the rights did not exist; the necessary implication
is that they do exist and that they can be exercised at that point. Thus,
the right to counsel can be exercised at the point of arrest or detention."'"
Another expansion in the language of article I, section 13 of the
Louisiana Constitution is the requirement that counsel be granted "at
each stage of the proceedings." This requires an analysis of what con-
stitutes each separate stage of the proceedings. As Professor Hargrave
notes: "[T]he language 'each stage' may be contrasted with the 'critical
stage' analysis of the federal standard and with the narrower statement
of the right in article I, section 9 of the 1921 constitution, which did
not include that language." '8 2 The United States Supreme Court has not
been clear as to what qualifies as a critical stage. 83 However, the Lou-
isiana Constitution requires that the right to counsel attach at an early
stage. In addition, a comparison of article I, section 13 to article I,
section 984 of the 1921 constitution evidences an intent by the redactors
of the 1974 constitution to expand the rights of those accused of criminal
activity.
The court's language in Matthews and Serrato hints at the early
attachment of the right to counsel under article I, section 13. The court
stated that the rights guaranteed by this section included "the right of
defendant to have counsel present during any post arrest interrogation." 85
Cases based on the United States Constitution draw a fine line between
the right to counsel under the fifth amendment and under the sixth
amendment. However, since article I, section 13 encompasses both the
fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel, that distinction becomes
nonexistent. A question that may be posed is whether, since this line
disappears and the right under the sixth amendment is thought to be
stronger,8 6 is the right to counsel at arrest or detainment the same as
that at formal adversary proceedings?
81. Hargrave, supra note 47, at 42.
82. Id. at 46.
83. See supra note 27.
84. Art. I § 9 of the 1921 constitution provided:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury; ... as provided elsewhere in this Constitution; ...
The accused in every instance shall have the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; he shall have the right to defend himself, to have the
assistance of counsel, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor.
85. State v. Serrato, 424 So. 2d 214, 220 (La. 1982) (emphasis added).
86. It is thought to be stronger because it attaches at judicial proceedings-closer to
the accused's potential loss of freedom.
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State v. Weedon8 7 indicates an affirmative answer. While Weedon
was present, his lawyer instructed the detectives not to question the
defendant as to any part of his case. The detectives then obtained the
lawyer's permission to allow questioning for the arrest register with the
assurance that they would only seek personal data. During the ques-
tioning the detectives deviated from the personal matters and extracted
incriminating statements. The court excluded the statements and said
that the defendant's "rights against self-incrimination and to the effective
assistance of counsel cannot be prejudiced by the state's failure to honor
its agreement not to question the accused about the crime unless his
attorneys are present.""8
It is apparent from Weedon and the construction of article I, section
13 that once the suspect is arrested he is clothed with all the constitutional
guarantees granted under article I, section 13. This is in contrast to his
federal constitutional rights, which protect him with the fifth amendment
protections upon arrest but with sixth amendment protections only upon
the onset of formal judicial proceedings.
It is evident from these Louisiana cases that the courts have no
qualms about using the exclusionary rule more extensively than required
by the United States Constitution. As Hargrave notes:
It is not surprising that this section [article I, section 131 does
not state the means of enforcing its requirements, as the entire
declaration of rights catalogues numerous guarantees without
providing specific means of enforcement for any of them. How-
ever, the convention's virtual incorporation of Miranda in the
constitution assumes continuation of the exclusionary rule for
enforcement of its provision." 9
A different inquiry results when the defendant asserts that the exclu-
sionary rule should apply to violations of statutory provisions such as
article 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Louisiana Statutory Violations
State v. Thomas9° dealt with a defendant whose statutory right under
Code of Criminal Procedure article 230 had been violated. Justice Lem-
mon for the majority stated that the court "need not apply a per se
exclusionary rule in this case, which does not involve a violation of
defendant's constitutional right to counsel," and that the exclusion of
reliable evidence was too great a price to impose in the absence of bad
87. 342 So. 2d 642 (La. 1977).
88.. Id. at 645.
89. Hargrave, supra note 47, at 44.
90. 406 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1981).
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faith on the part of the police. 9' A penalty for failure to comply with
statutory requirements is provided by law.
92
State v. Square93 reasoned that the statutory provisions of Code of
Criminal Procedure articles 228, 229, and 230 are "administrative or
ministerial functions," and that "[a] departure from acceptable concepts
of judicial restraint would occur if this Court were to superimpose an
exclusionary rule over this legislative plan, a rule which would in all
probability only benefit the guilty accused and which would not be likely
to deter the negligent or culpable official." ' 94 The Square decision made
clear that there was no automatic exclusionary penalty for statutory
violations and that, if there were a penalty, statutory violations would
be considered in light of their statutory purpose and exclusionary im-
pact. 95
The greatest impact of statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 and 15:452 is to show
the legislature's intent with regard to the rights of the accused. For
example, the similar phrasing of article 230 and article I, section 13
indicates that the redactors in enacting article 230 meant to emphasize
the rights of the accused. The importance of the statutory rights can
not be dismissed just because a violation does not require automatic
exclusion. 96 One commentator notes that an effective and fair scheme
of law should not provide for a "simplistic automatic exclusionary rule"
whether it relates to statutory, federal or state constitutional rights;
rather, it is crucial that the foundation for implementing the exclusionary
rule be "directly, frankly, and carefully addressed if a rational exclu-
sionary policy is to be developed.
' 97
91. Id. at 1328.
92. Id. at 1329. La. R.S. 14:134 (1986) provides:
Malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer or public employee
shall:
(1) Intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him,
as such officer or employee; or
(2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful manner; or
(3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee, under his
authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required
of him, or to perform any such duty in an unlawful manner.
Whoever commits the crime of malfeasance in office shall be imprisoned for
not more than five years with or without hard labor or shall be fined not more
than five thousand dollars or both.
93. 257 La. 743, 244 So. 2d 200 (1971).
94. Id. at 215.
95. Id.
96. Lamonica, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 41
La. L. Rev. 643 (1981).




It is evident by the language in Moran that the Supreme Court is
moving toward a narrow interpretation of Miranda, which will result
in a further diminution of the rights of the accused. Moran will restrict
the instances in which a court will determine that a waiver of the right
to counsel is invalid. Future decisions based on the fifth and sixth
amendment right to counsel will be held to this narrower standard, and
the court will not allow state courts freedom to interpret these federal
rights differently. 98 It is apparent that the court has established a rule
in Moran that will be strictly applied. The best avenue for the accused
may be to look more closely at the Louisiana Constitution, particularly
article I, section 13, and other statutory rights, 99 since the Moran majority
was interpreting only the United States Constitution, and, as Justice
O'Connor stated, "[n]othing we say today disables the States from
adopting different requirements for the conduct of its employees and
officials as a matter of state law."'0
The Louisiana Constitution grants the accused a broader right to
counsel than the United States Constitution. If Louisiana courts continue
to follow the Matthews and Serrato line of cases, the Moran decision
will have no effect in Louisiana. It is apparent by the Louisiana Con-
stitution, statutes and case law that Louisiana favors the attachment of
the right to counsel at the earliest stage and imposes high standards on
the prosecution to show a waiver of these rights. Furthermore, Matthews
and Trevathan indicate that courts "enhance the requirement that law
enforcement officers act in a professional manner in adhering to the
reasonable requests and expectations of counsel with respect to inter-
rogation of a client."' 01 Trevathan also places "a strict duty on law
enforcement officers to assure that reasonable requests of counsel are
respected."11°2
Tamera A. Rudd
98. See, e.g., State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1985); Lodowski v. Maryland,
302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del. 1983).
99. La. Civ. Code arts. 228-230; La. R.S. 15:451 and 452 (1981).
100. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145 (1986).
101. Lamonica, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 43
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